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In this note, the Cosmic Microwave Background (CMB) Radiation is shown to be capable of functioning 
as a Random Bit Generator, and constitutes an effectively infinite supply of truly random one-time pad 
values of arbitrary length. It is further argued that the CMB power spectrum potentially conforms to the 
FIPS 140-2 standard. Additionally, its applicability to the generation of a (n×n) random key matrix for a 
Vernam cipher is established.  
 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Overview of the CMB 
 
A remnant of the Epoch of Recombination in Big Bang cosmology, the CMB is a pervasive, 
highly spatially isotropic radiation field permeating all of the visible universe. With a thermal blackbody 
temperature of 2.72548 ± 0.00057 K [1], the spectral radiance peak occurs at 1063.3 µm (282.1 GHz).  
 
The power spectrum of the CMB has been well-mapped by the Planck mission1, and the 
likelihood has been determined by the Planck data and described in detail by Ade et al. [2]. The CMB 
power spectrum is a unique spectral fingerprint of the core cosmological model. Planck’s map, made over 
a 4π sr solid angle and to a precision of several arcminutes, results in the power spectrum being attainable 
over an unprecedented range. The estimation of cosmological parameters from the power spectrum 
necessitates an uncertainty-propagating likelihood function, a property which can also be particularly 
useful for cryptographic purposes. At low multipoles, an approach based on Gibbs sampling is applicable 
[3], [4] because the power spectrum is non-Gaussian at large scales. For high multipoles, a pseudo-Cl 
technique is useful [5]. 
 
In the case of high multipoles, the Planck maps are comprised of 5 × 107 pixels per detector, and 
the determination of a per pixel likelihood would be computationally impractical. However, 
                                                        
1 Planck (http://www.esa.int/Planck) is a European Space Agency (ESA) project carrying instruments supplied by, 
in particular, France and Italy. Contributions were made by NASA, and telescope reflectors were provided by an 
ESA-Denmark-led scientific consortium. 
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implementation of a data compression algorithm in the form of pseudo-Cl power spectra would result in a 
significant reduction in processing times and negligible information loss.  
 
In contrast to the CamSpec likelihood, in which the deconvolved spectra is formed without any 
prior smoothing of the pseudo-spectra 
ij
lC
~
 (given by eqn. (2)), the likP likelihood, which is often used for 
robustness and cross-checks tests [6], is chosen. 
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where 
i
lmT
~
 are the spherical harmonic coefficients of the weighted temperature map as produced by 
detector i; l is the pseudo-spectrum multipole; (i, j) is the detector pair, and † indicates the Hermitian 
transpose. 
 
The exact likelihood for a full-sky Gaussian signal is given by:  
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where θ is the signal model parameters vector; lCˆ  are the empirical angular spectra, and    ll CC ,ˆ  is the 
Kullback divergence between n-variant Gaussian distributions with zero-means and covariant matrices lCˆ  and 
 lC .    ll CC ,ˆ  is given by [2]: 
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Performing cutoffs of the observable sky introduces off-diagonal terms of the covariance between 
various monopoles. However, with clever binning, the off-diagonal terms are insignificant, and slowly 
varying spectra sources, such as the CMB anisotropies, can be modeled. In so doing, eqn. (2) becomes 
 
     Lexp|maps p  (4) 
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 In this case, the angular spectra lC  for each of the cross-frequency spectra have been averaged 
and placed in R spectral bins. The associated spectral windows  lwr  with Rr ...1  result in: 
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where  lwr  is the window function for the rth bin. C represents both binned and unbinned spectra.  
 If the criteria for spectral binning are 
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 then the effective number of modes in the rth bin is 
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where f  is the observed sky frequency. 
 
 This binned likelihood is in particularly good agreement with the primary likelihood, even though 
all couplings between the various multipoles are not captured; the effective computational speed is greatly 
increased. This rise in computational speed makes performing a vast set of robustness tests possible 
because the number of tested parameters per unit time is significantly boosted. Additionally, the 
investigation of instrumental effects, such as spurious signals in the electronics of the detectors, can be 
expedited swiftly, and the agreement between detector pairs within a frequency channel can be promptly 
ascertained [2]. 
 
 Since the likP  likelihood includes the empirical auto-spectra, it allows for a direct estimate of the 
detector noise power spectra. Additionally, the noise estimates agree well with the noise spectra employed 
in the formation of the CamSpec likelihood covariance matrix [2]. To produce the CMB power spectrum, 
a two-step process is employed. First, all parameters, including the noise, are estimated using both the 
auto- and cross-spectra. Second, the noise estimates are fixed, and a fiducial Gaussian approximation 
allows for the exploration (and ultimately the extraction) of the residual free parameters, including the 
CMB power spectrum and excluding the auto-spectra [2]. The extracted CMB power spectrum can then 
be used as a private encryption key or to generate an asymmetric key pair. 
2. The Cryptographic Application 
 
The effect of key length on cryptographic security has been well established [7], [8], [9], [10], 
[11], [12]. The CMB power spectrum, the binning and extraction of which is described in the previous 
section, is an unpredictable, arbitrarily large and totally random number2 that can be used by Alice (a 
sender) to generate an acceptable public- and private-key pair appropriate for use by an asymmetric key 
algorithm (see Figure 1). 
                                                        
2 Or a matrix, depending on whether detector pairs are considered. 
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Figure 1: Diagrammatic representation of the use of a large random number to implement a key generation program3. 
 
Alice’s acquisition of the CMB power spectrum at any chosen sky frequency can be done with 
arbitrary precision (to the limit of the sensitivity and subject to the signal to noise ratio of the detectors) 
and for an arbitrary period of time appears to be a strategy that could also be employed by Eve (an 
adversary). Of course, this presupposes that Eve would have gained prior knowledge of the stellar 
coordinates from which CMB power spectrum was observed, the frequency of observation, the time and 
duration of the observation(s), the binning parameters, etc.  
 
However, even allowing for the possibility that Eve was privy to such specific information, the 
exact duplication of the Alice’s random number generated from the CMB power spectrum is not possible 
due to random variations in photon energy at any sky frequency, spurious signals within the detectors, 
interference from other sources of stellar radio noise, etc. Therefore, the digitized CMB power spectrum 
obtained by Alice is unique and cannot be acquired through “identical” power spectrum observations of 
the CMB by Eve.  
 
It is noteworthy that although a similar encryption strategy could be (and has been) implemented 
with irrational numbers, the digits of which would provide true randomness and an arbitrarily large key 
space, the number, once known, is rendered a one-time pad. Repeated CMB power spectrum 
measurements would allow the same key space source to be used indefinitely, and knowledge of the 
origin of the key space source would not nullify the CMB power spectrum as a key space source (i.e., if a 
key space source irrational number is discovered by Eve, then the pattern of digits is known by Eve; this 
would not be true of the CMB power spectrum). Of course, there is no shortage of available irrational 
numbers; however, even Alice does not know the digits of the CMB power spectrum key space prior to 
measurement. Once the CMB power spectrum has been resolved, this information would need to be 
transmitted to Bob (a receiver) by one of the conventional methods, making it neither more nor less 
secure than any other key transmitted the same way. Such an approach would be arguably effective for 
symmetric-key algorithms. In the case of asymmetric-key algorithms, the private key could be generated 
by means of the CMB power spectrum, and the private key would obviously need be created with 
parameters by which its calculation, by Eve, would be computationally infeasible. 
 
While all-encompassing of the visible universe and well-studied, it’s important to point out that 
the CMB is by no means the only truly random astrophysical Random Bit Generator (RBG). The 21 cm 
hydrogen line, planetary (non-terrestrial) radio noise, supernova remnants, radio galaxies, etc. are all 
viable candidate RBGs. None of the above-mentioned potential RBGs require the deployment of 
interplanetary spacecraft or even satellites. A terrestrial radio telescope would suffice, thus making 
astrophysical entropy sources accessible on comparatively modest budgets. 
 
                                                        
3 Image from: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/32/Public-key-crypto-1.svg 
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3. The CMB Power Spectrum RBG’s Potential for Conformity to FIPS 140-2 
 
 Argued here is that the CMB power spectrum method of random number generation to produce 
both private- and public-keys meets the requirements for conformity to the United States government 
computer security standard FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standard) used for the 
accreditation of cryptographic modules as laid out in the United States Department of Commerce (DOC) 
Recommendations [13]. The DOC Recommendations advise that all encryption keys be based directly or 
indirectly on the output of an approved Random Bit Generator.  
 
 Keys indirectly generated from a RBG include those derived during an agreement transaction 
[14], derived from another key using a key derivation function [15], or derived from a password for 
storage applications [16] because an ancestor key4 or random value5 was obtained directly from the output 
of an approved RBG. Although deconvolution of a CMB power spectrum is not currently specified as an 
approved RBG, its potential candidacy for approval is strong; the same argument can be made for other 
astrophysical sources of entropy. 
 
The two sets of cryptographic algorithms necessitating cryptographic keys, which have been 
approved for use by the United States government, are asymmetric-key algorithms and symmetric-key 
algorithms, for which random number generation from a CMB power spectrum is viable. 
 
Additionally, the RGB or portion of the RGB cryptographic module [17] that generates the key 
must “reside” within the FIPS 140 key-generating module6. In the case of the CMB power spectrum, the 
entropy source clearly does not co-reside with the random-output-generating algorithm. The transporting 
of generated keys using secure channels and their use by the associated cryptographic algorithm within 
FIPS 140-compliant cryptographic modules are implied, irrespective of the random-number-generating 
entropy source.  
 
The security strength of the RGB must be adequate for the protection of the target data. Details on 
the security strength for approved RGBs can be found in [17], [18], [19]. A key’s security strength is 
dependent on the key size [20], the key-generating process, the security strength of the method of 
transporting the key, and of course, the algorithm by which it was generated.  
 
It is notable that the supported security strength by a key is not dependent exclusively on the 
length of the key. For instance, if a n-bit key is used with an AES-n (e.g., AES-128) for the encryption of 
plaintext, then an AES operation employing that key can provide only m bits of security strength if m < n. 
While the key strength is often less important to the security of a cryptographic cipher than the strength of 
the algorithm(s), a strong key is never disadvantageous. 
 
 
3.1 RBG Output 
 
The DOC Recommendations require that approved output of a RBG boast adequate security 
strength to protect the plaintext by means of a symmetric key or the needed random number for the 
generation of an asymmetric key pair (for which an approved generating algorithm is required).  
 
 
                                                        
4 A key used to generate another key. 
5 For example, a random value that was used to create a key-agreement key pair. 
6 The cryptographic module in which the key is generated. 
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For key/random number generation, the following criterion is imposed: 
 
WVK   (8) 
 
where K is the key generated by an approved RBG (symmetric key) or a random number generated by an 
approved RBG (asymmetric key pair); W is the required length bit string with the capability of protecting 
the plaintext, and V is bit string equal in length to W and determined in a fashion that is independent of W.  
 
The lack of restrictions placed on the choice of V requires that the means by which W is selected 
bestow the crucial entropy. The selection of W and/or V from a CMB power spectrum will allow for any 
required bit string length to protect plaintext of any size and importance. The computational and 
informational independence of V and W assures that neither bit string can be determined from the other. 
Clearly, the implementation of a CMB power spectrum as a RBG will not violate this requisite. 
 
4. The Application of the CMB Power Spectrum to a Vernam Cipher 
 
The CMB power spectrum has a direct application to symmetric key cryptography and the 
creation of a Vernam cipher7, in that it can serve as a key for the generation of a random key matrix. In 
their paper, Nath et al. consider a reasonably robust (16×16) random key matrix, and make use of a 16-
character key, which could be comprised of any of the 0-255 ASCII characters [21]. Although 
significantly more computationally intensive, the CMB power spectrum allows for a (n×n) random key 
matrix, and each “character” would be represented by a string of m < n digits. From the data in Table 1, 
Nath et al. generate their key with eqn. (9) [21]: 
 
Length of 
Key (n) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Base (b) 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
Table 1: Key length and base for a 16×16 random key matrix [21]. 

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where S is the key sum; n is the length of the key; C is the ASCII code, and b is the base.  
 
Implementation of a CMB power spectrum using this method would require that C in eqn. (9) be 
replaced by a character code comprised of either: 
 
1. a series of random digits in the intensity measure of the resolved CMB power spectrum with 
known measurement parameters arriving at a single detector, as discussed in Section 1 (i.e., sky 
frequency, binning parameters, spatial coordinates, time of measurement, duration of 
measurement, etc.), or 
2. a series of random digits from multiple intensity measurements of the resolved CMB power 
spectrum arriving at multiple detectors and with known measurement parameters (as in case #1). 
 
                                                        
7 Also called a “one-time pad”. 
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This modification to the method of Nath et al. allows for a much larger key space, the encryption 
and decryption of which can be computationally feasible, but for which brute force attacks upon the 
cipher become exponentially infeasible. Furthermore, the CMB power spectrum generated key space can 
be constructed to be significantly in excess of the computing capabilities of current hardware architecture, 
thus imposing upper limits on the practical key space size. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The Cosmic Microwave Background radiation, a highly isotropic remnant of the Recombination 
Epoch in Big Bang cosmology, has been shown to be a highly applicable Random Bit Generator for 
asymmetric and symmetric cryptography capable of conforming to the United States government’s 
Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS 140-2. When applied to a Vernam cipher and extended to 
key spaces in excess of the 256 ASCII character set, the CMB power spectrum offers the capacity for a 
key space that is too large for not only brute force attacks, but also can be too large for the 
encryption/decryption capacities of present computer systems. 
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